Introduction
It is argued in economic literature that if markets were perfectly efficient, capital regulation would not be necessary (see Butsic, 1994) . Levels of capital to hold would be determined by insurers and market forces would price premia depending on the risk of the insurer becoming insolvent. On the demand side, consumers would be fully informed and would diversify their insurance policies across insurance providers accounting for default risk. However, perfect markets do not exist in reality. Asymmetrical information between insurers and consumers is significant and externalities from insolvency can be considerable. Prudential regulation helps to overcome such forms of market failure.
Insurance firms, and especially life insurance firms, often invest heavily in risky assets such as equities in order to give better returns to policyholders and higher dividends to shareholders. Firms are required to hold solvency capital to cover these risks. Most countries supplement solvency capital requirements by regulating the portfolio of assets covering firms' liabilities. Generally, two types of portfolio regulation, the Prudent Person Rule (PPR) and Quantity Restrictions (QR), are applied around the world. The PPR requires that firms invest prudently. This can be interpreted as following broad principles of portfolio diversification and assetliability matching. QR, on the contrary, aim to limit the riskiness of asset portfolios by preventing firms from investing more than a given share of their portfolio in specific asset classes (e.g. a typical QR might be a limit of 35% of the portfolio invested in equity) and by imposing concentration limits, i.e. the percentage that may be invested in any given security. A further differentiation we make within QR is that of strong and weak QR. This is based on differences in limits imposed on equity holdings, where strong QR are limits of 30 per cent or lower. Our analysis focuses only on restrictions on asset classes. The reason for this approach is that there is currently harmonization across EU member states on explicit concentration limits (although there may be variation applied individual member state level). There is, however, explicit variation on asset class restrictions, with many member states imposing superequivalent requirements to the EU Solvency I minimum requirements.
The motivation for the paper is as follows. In unconstrained portfolio choice, investors choose portfolios which lie on the efficient frontier. This theoretical boundary represents the minimum level of risk which can be incurred to achieve any given level of expected return (through optimal portfolios that exploit underlying correlations between assets). The intuition is that if investors have the freedom to invest in any asset they will combine them to form an optimal portfolio that offers the highest return for the level of risk they are willing to take (or conversely the lowest risk for the level of returns they wish to achieve). Where QR limit the range of assets or the amounts that can be invested in specific asset classes, investors are not able to fully take advantage of the diversification benefits that arise from weak or negative correlations between different asset classes. For example, restrictions on foreign asset holdings impose constraints on global diversification, which would allow portfolio risk to be reduced, through investments in non-domestic markets which do not perfectly covary with domestic markets. QR can therefore negatively impact on the performance of insurance firms' portfolios, creating a regulatory cost for firms without any corresponding benefits for consumers. On this basis, the paper addresses the following question: to what extent do the restrictions on asset allocations under QR relative to PPR reduce the risk-adjusted returns that life insurance firms can achieve through their portfolio of assets?
We investigate differences in investment returns across a sample of OECD countries which follow 'pure' PPR or 'pure' QR using firm-level balance sheet data. This crosscountry comparison builds on Davis (2001) , which is largely a descriptive analysis of insurance fund returns based on aggregate data. We extend his work by adjusting for risk, given the need to control for variation in returns which is attributable purely to variation in risk targets, i.e. we distinguish movements along from distortions below the efficient frontier. Furthermore, by formulating a panel data econometric model we isolate the impact of QR regulation, holding constant all other factors which affect fund returns. It proves important to include these control variables, especially given that cross-country variation in asset market returns and volatilities and size of the firm are highly significant in explaining portfolio returns across countries.
There is little other literature on the impact of QR and PPR. Two US-based studies examine the impact of PPR comparing investments of funds subject to these rules with funds that are unaffected by them. Del Guercio (JFE, 1996) examines the distorting effects of PPR in the US on stock selection in pension funds, whereas our main concern is with the impact on returns rather than portfolio composition. Chen et al (2005) look at the impact of regulation on the returns of mutual funds which are managed by insurers, whereas we look at the returns of funds held by insurance firms.
Our main results provide evidence of an economically and statistically significant impact of QR on portfolio returns for life insurance firms, of the magnitude of around 2-3 percentage points, adjusting for risk and controlling for other relevant factors.
There is a marked difference in the impact of strong and weak QR compared to the PPR. Strong QR have a negative impact on unadjusted returns of around 4 percentage points whereas weak QR do not seem to impose any costs above the PPR. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions that, by imposing explicit limits on investment in risky asset classes, QR constrain firms' ability to reduce risk by diversifying across the range of eligible asset classes and across countries, and thereby distort portfolio choice below the efficient frontier. We find that, on average, firms in PPR countries take on lower portfolio risk (as measured by the estimated standard deviation) than firms in QR countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the dataset used and data issues. In Section 3 we set out the econometric model and estimation techniques employed. In Section 4 we discuss our results and policy implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data issues
We use the Eurothesys database (a product of Standard & Poor's) which provides financial statements data for insurance firms in OECD countries over a period of nine years. We use book values for the investment portfolio. This is firstly because data on market values were unavailable for a large proportion of the sample, and secondly due to the poor quality of the data on market values. Therefore, to be consistent, book values are used throughout the study.
The selection of specific countries in our sample is based on: a) Availability of data; b) Availability of details on PPR and QR approaches in the countries;
The sample used for the study is described in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Sample description
The information on regulatory approaches is based on rules in existence in 2001 (taken from Davis (2001)). The sample includes a total of 268 firms, both public companies and mutuals. Neither public companies nor mutuals are restricted to QR or PPR countries.
The time period covers 1995-2004 and is based on annual data. The dataset is an unbalanced panel, with some firms missing observations for the earlier or later part of the time series.
The total number of observations is 1,223, after eliminating outliers on investment returns and missing investment categories. 1 Observations where firms did not report holdings in bonds or equities were dropped from the sample. Firms not reporting property holdings were retained however, given that it is plausible that many firms will not invest in property (smaller firms in particular who do not benefit from economies of scale from property investment). Germany had a high level of unreported investment, resulting in an upward bias on the average weight in equities and leading to exceptionally high average portfolio risk for German firms. 
Methodology
We assess the impact of regulation on risk adjusted portfolio returns. Our methodology is formulated in order to test whether PPR countries earn higher returns than QR countries holding constant the level of risk, i.e. we want to distinguish between distortions away from the efficient frontier and movements along the efficient frontier.
Risk Adjustment
The methodology for adjusting returns for risk is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The standard approach used in the academic literature in adjusting for risk is to run (multi-factor) Jensen regressions, in which the time series of portfolio returns is regressed on a constant term (which estimates the abnormal performance) and the relevant market indices (which estimate the fund beta). However, this was not possible given that our time series spans only nine years annual data (for many firms less than this).
Therefore, we adjust for risk using the Sharpe ratio methodology. This is considered a less accurate instrument for adjusting for risk compared to Jensen regressions, as it does not disaggregate between systematic risk (as measure by the portfolio beta) and idiosyncratic risk. The distinction is important given that idiosyncratic risk (firm specific risk) can be diversified away whereas systematic risk (as measured by correlation with the market portfolio) cannot. However, it is considered an acceptable methodology under conditions of data limitations. The Sharpe ratio is defined as the excess return (Expected value of [Return(portfolio) -Risk Free Rate]) divided by the standard deviation of returns. The advantages of using Sharpe ratios are that they are simple to estimate, scale-independent (i.e. funds with different total asset values are directly comparable) and robust to data limitations (i.e. they do not require a long time series or high frequency (monthly/quarterly) data).
The basic theory behind the Sharpe ratio as a measure of risk-adjusted portfolio performance can be summarized as follows. Based on CAPM, if portfolio X has a higher Sharpe ratio than portfolio Y, then this implies portfolio X is more efficient than Y. Hence, all investors will prefer portfolio X (irrespective of risk preferences) even if Y has lower risk than X, since the same risk target of portfolio Y can be replicated but with a higher expected return by choosing portfolio X and moving down the Capital Market Line, i.e. shifting out of stocks/bonds and into cash.
This can be demonstrated more clearly in the following efficiency frontier diagram. An unconstrained PPR firm optimizes by choosing the tangency portfolio at point A. The constrained QR firm must locate below the efficient frontier at point C.
Suppose the regulatory risk threshold is set at 99.5% confidence as indicated in Figure 1 below. Hence, both firms must shift down the Capital Market Line, such that the PPR firm locates at B, but the QR firm locates at D. Essentially, our model estimates the efficiency loss imposed by QR, holding constant the level of risk (i.e. magnitude of BD). 
Econometric Model
To isolate the impact of QR as opposed to PPR regulation on risk-adjusted portfolio returns (Sharpe ratios), we formulate the following econometric model:
The dependent variable is specified as the per-period Sharpe ratio, i.e. the excess return per unit of risk. We construct the portfolio return (r ijt ) from the underlying balance sheet data denominated in domestic currency using the following formula:
The denominator is lagged following the convention of using balance sheet data (i.e. total investment is a stock variable whereas investment income and net unrealised gains are flow variables). 3 We use post-tax nominal returns (gross of management expenses).
We estimate portfolio risk as the portfolio standard deviation using the variances of and correlations between the major asset classes (bonds, equities, properties) and applying the actual weights invested in each of these asset classes for each firm using the following formula:
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(1) (2) where E=equities; B=bonds; P=properties; and Although this measure does not include the entire set of admissible assets (which include, for example, derivatives and loans backed by mortgages), it comprises the major asset classes to which restrictions are applied.
The risk free interest rate is defined as the three-month money market rate, in line with empirical studies in the academic literature (see for example, Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman, 1993) 4 . Market returns are also specified using market Sharpe ratios given that, as well as controlling for the impact of cross country variation in returns, we also need to control for cross country variation in market volatilities.
Equity returns used are total returns including re-invested dividends. Bond returns used are total returns including re-invested coupons. Time series data on property prices were unavailable, so property returns were estimated using market returns on property funds. This is a reasonable proxy, given the strong historical correlation between property prices and returns on property funds.
Size is specified using dummy variables, measured on total technical provisions using the classification for life insurance firms adopted by the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), as shown in Table 2 below: 12
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As an alternative we used yields on 10 year government bonds as the measure of the risk-free rate of return. There is no significant change in the results. 
Regulation index
We construct two different proxies to estimate the impact of regulation. The first is a simple 0/1 dummy variable which takes value 0 for PPR countries and 1 for QR countries. However, given that there is significant heterogeneity across countries within the type of quantitative restrictions applied, we re-estimate using a categorical variable in which countries are split into three groups defined as PPR, weak QR and strong QR, as summarized in the table below. Our priors are that restrictions on equities and foreign assets would impose the greatest constraints on portfolio returns. But given that restrictions on foreign assets are fairly homogeneous across the QR sample, the designation of weak as opposed to strong QR depends on the limit on equities. We therefore designated any country with a limit on equities less than or equal to 30 per cent as strong QR as described in Table 3 below. 
Fund management skills
Fund performance depends on asset allocation, security selection, market timing and other factors. Although there is a debate on the exact size of the impact of each of the elements, there is a consensus that asset allocation is the main determinant of fund performance. Several studies support the view that asset allocation explains most of the portfolio returns and volatility (see for example, Brinson, Hood and Beebower, 1991; Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000; Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann, 1999) . Arguably, the skills needed for asset allocation are not as sophisticated as those required for market timing or security selection. Furthermore, many studies have shown that fund managers are not able persistently to out perform the market in the long run. Therefore, we believe that including a country-specific fund manager skills variable would not improve the results of our analysis based on nine years of fund returns data.
Taxes
Since we have post tax data on investment returns, it is possible that some of the variation in investment returns is driven by cross-country differences in tax regimes. However, as there is a fairly complex system of capital gains taxes and other allowances and exemptions specific to insurance firms, we are unable to incorporate a variable to capture these complexities and the results need to be caveated accordingly.
Foreign Assets
The insurance firms included in our sample might invest in foreign assets as well as investing in domestic assets. Due to lack of information at the firm-level on investment in foreign markets, the impact of the performance of foreign markets on the risk-adjusted return is not captured in our model. This could affect our ability to control for the portfolio risk to the extent that firms investing in non-domestic assets will take on different amounts of foreign currency risk but will also benefit from more extended diversification possibilities.
Hypotheses
We test the null hypothesis that QR have no effect on risk-adjusted returns against the alternative that risk-adjusted returns are decreased under QR.
Panel data estimation
We undertake the following estimations of the econometric model defined in equation (1): 1) Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): where we impose homogeneity on the intercept term across firms.
2) Random Effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS):
where we retain homogeneity on the intercept term but allow for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity in the error term. The underlying assumption here is that these firm specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors.
3) Hausman-Taylor (H-T) estimation: Although we follow Mundlak (1978) and assume the individual effects are randomly distributed across the population as a whole, there is still the possibility that the within sample effects are correlated with the regressors. Indeed, although it is reasonable to assume that such effects are randomly distributed across the entire population of countries, it is possible that within our small sample of countries these effects might be correlated with the regressors and thus cause parameter estimates to be biased. The standard approach in this situation is to estimate fixed effects OLS, which models variable intercepts to allow for the possibility that firm-specific or country-specific effects are correlated with the regressors. Our intuition is that this might be important if investment styles differ across countries simply due to cultural preferences, such as home country bias. Fixed effects might arise also due to variation in investment management objectives, i.e. profitmaximizing public companies as opposed to mutually-owned companies. However, in order to estimate fixed effects, we must drop the regulation dummies given the problem of linear dependence and failure of the full rank condition when including both fixed effects and time invariant regressors. Intuitively, the time invariant regulation effect gets absorbed into the fixed effect, and is therefore no longer identified. This still gives an indication of whether there is a problem of fixed effects, but is by no means conclusive given that it is quite plausible that the presence of fixed effects could simply be capturing the omitted regulation variable. In order to get a more conclusive test of the presence of fixed effects, we undertake H-T estimation, which accommodates fixed effects in the presence of time invariant regressors. H-T estimation is a form of two stage least squares, the first stage involves estimating fixed effects OLS but dropping the time invariant regressors. The residuals are then extracted and regressed on the time invariant regressors. Regressors must be classified as exogenous (uncorrelated with the group specific effects) or endogenous (correlated with the group specific effects). The group means of the time varying exogenous variables are then used as instruments for the time invariant endogenous variables (for our purposes the QR variable). As outlined in Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte (2003), we conduct the Hausman test on random effects GLS as opposed to H-T, to detect the presence of fixed effects. The Hausman-Taylor estimation is applied to the QR dummy. As part of further work, this will be extended to the weak and strong QR variables, using additional data for other OECD countries.
Choice of Estimator
The choice of the appropriate estimation procedure was made through use of the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test. As a first step, we compared the OLS and random effects GLS estimates. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects was significant at the 10 per cent level, indicating weak evidence of individual effects or unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.
As a second step we also investigated whether the unobserved effects are random (uncorrelated) or fixed (correlated with the regressors). In order to test whether these were fixed or random effects, we conducted H-T estimation and used the Hausman test on Random Effects (RE) as opposed to H-T. Hausman gives a strong rejection of H-T in favour of RE (we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no fixed effects at the 10 per cent level), indicating there is no evidence of fixed effects. Hence, we favour RE over H-T. The first step in the H-T estimation procedure was to estimate fixed effects OLS (dropping the QR dummy) and conduct Hausman to determine which of the regressors were exogenous and therefore useful as instruments. The results indicate that although overall Hausman rejects FE in favour of RE, the estimates for size and property returns were significantly different, and so these were classified as endogenous. The parameter estimates for equity and bond returns however were very similar hence were taken as exogenous and used to instrument the QR variables. The correlations with the QR variable were not high, but sufficient to avoid a weak instrument problem. H-T imposes an identification condition that the number of exogenous time varying regressors (bond returns & equity returns) must be greater than or equal to the number of endogenous time invariant regressors (QR), hence this is satisfied. Although the parameter estimates for the QR variable do vary significantly between the two estimations, the QR estimate is actually larger under H-T. The purpose of testing for fixed effects was to determine whether the QR estimate was being biased upwards by fixed effects. However, the results suggest that this is not the case, if anything, the bias is in the other direction. However, one cannot put too much emphasis on the precise numerical estimates of H-T estimation given that it relies on an instrumentation of the QR variable (which is not perfect). It is useful more in terms of providing a statistical test for the presence of fixed effects.
Given only weak evidence of random effects, and no evidence of fixed effects, we conclude that pooled OLS is the preferred estimator. All results which follow therefore pertain to pooled OLS.
Results
Main results
The regulation coefficient is negative and economically and statistically significant. It estimates excess returns (defined as portfolio returns minus the risk-free interest rate) adjusted for risk and these are on average 2-3 percentage points lower in QR countries, holding constant all other variables.
Results on the three tier regulation index suggest there is an economically and statistically significant difference between the PPR and strong QR regulation but not between PPR and weak QR regulation, where strong QR refers to countries with a limit of less than or equal to 30 per cent on equity holdings. Risk adjusted returns in strong QR countries are around 4 percentage points lower than in PPR countries, holding constant all other variables, whereas in weak QR countries they are not significantly different to those in PPR countries. While the limits on equity holdings in weak QR countries are in the order of 60 per cent, in practice firms subject to these limits hold below 20 per cent in equities on average. Hence, these restrictions are not binding and have only limited benefits.
Furthermore, the results are robust to choice of estimator, with pooled OLS, RE GLS and between group estimation.
Discussion of results
Control Variables
We first discuss whether the parameter estimates on control variables are consistent with our priors and with predictions of economic theory. There is a significant positive impact of market returns (adjusted for market volatility) on portfolio risk adjusted returns for equity and bond markets, consistent with our priors. The coefficient on property returns is not significant at 10 per cent level, which seems to be due to low average property holdings in the sample.
The size coefficient for large firms is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. Larger firms as measured by total technical provisions are found to have lower risk-adjusted returns. The results are economically significant, large firms (classified as in table 2) have lower risk-adjusted returns on average by 2.7 percentage points, ceteris paribus. This result is consistent with findings in other empirical studies, e.g. Blake, Timmerman and Lehmann (2002) , who explain this as being due to the "size is an anchor to performance" effect, i.e. large investing institutions with a large market share in a given market cannot benefit fully from active trading given that trading induces more easily detectable price movements.
Regulation variables
We find a negative impact of regulation on risk-adjusted returns that is both economically and statistically significant. This finding holds irrespective of the estimation procedure employed, i.e. pooled OLS, Random Effects GLS, and Between Groups (BG) estimations (the BG estimator is simply OLS on the group means). We take pooled OLS as our preferred estimator, which indicates excess returns per unit risk are 0.45 points lower in QR countries. Given an average risk of 6.9 per cent across our sample, this implies excess returns adjusted for risk are 3.1 percentage points lower, holding all other variables constant.
The results on the three tier regulation index indicate an economically and statistically significant difference between PPR and strong QR countries. Weak QR do not appear to be binding (i.e. some firms in PPR countries themselves choose to operate within weak QR limits) and is no longer statistically significant at 10 per cent level. Strong QR variable is statistically significant at 1 percent level and economically significant with a negative impact of around 4 percentage points on risk-adjusted returns.
It is instructive to compare the descriptive analysis with the econometric results.
Comparing average unadjusted returns across PPR and QR countries, we find returns are 1.2 percentage points lower in QR countries. The reason for the larger econometric estimates of 2.1-3.1 percentage points is due to risk adjustment and also a result of controlling for market returns across the countries. Indeed, firms in QR countries had, on average, riskier portfolios than in PPR countries while their domestic markets performed better over the time period considered. These two elements were hiding the true cost of QR.
The results for the three estimators are given for the QR and the strong QR variables in Table 4 below:
Table 4 Values of the QR and Strong QR Regulation Variables
All three estimators report similar results, which gives a good indication of model robustness. This indicates that there does not appear to be a problem of random or fixed effects. The detailed results are in Table A1 .
F -Wald tests were performed on the restriction of equality of coefficients on the weak QR and strong QR dummies, and were rejected at the 1 per cent level. These results indicate that, as well as the impact of QR as opposed to PPR, one needs to take into consideration the type and strength of QR applied. 
Missing investment categories
As a further robustness check, we determine whether removing missing investment categories may have created a sample bias and distorted the results. In terms of the econometric results, excluding observations with missing investments reduces the QR estimate from 3.9 to 3.1 percentage points. The reason for this is that the estimate was biased upwards by the exceptionally high-risk estimates for Germany. Excluding missing investments also decreases the significance level of the QR estimate from 1 to 5 per cent. This is due to the smaller sample size which increases the size of the standard errors. Excluding Germany from the sample entirely brings down the QR estimate slightly to 2.7 percentage points. Overall, the series of tests confirm the robustness of our results and QR estimate. There is no significant bias introduced by either the inclusion or exclusion of the German firms.
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Book versus market values
The portfolio values used here are book values not market values, for the reasons discussed earlier. While this has little effect on our risk measure, it does affect the rate of return on assets. Firms in some QR countries have significantly larger asset portfolios when measured in market values instead of book values. This is not the case for firms in PPR countries. Since rates of return reflect market values, the use of book values artificially increases the rate of return earned by firms in the QR countries referred to above. In this respect, the QR effect reported in this paper is likely to be an understatement of the true QR effect.
Other specifications
We also test for other variables that may have an impact on investment returns, including capital ratios. These variables are not significant and therefore have not been reported in the results of our preferred specification.
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A further re-estimation of the model by treating missing investment instruments as debt in case of Germany, based on the premise that they are "pfandbriefe" was also carried out. The revised results raised the QR estimate to 3.9 percentage points.
Other robustness tests
Swamy Random Coefficients Estimation (RCM) (see Table A2 )
We also generalized the OLS estimation by allowing heterogeneity in the slope coefficients (for the size and market returns regressors) across countries. Homogeneity of coefficients is rejected at the 1 per cent level, indicating strong presence of country specific heterogeneity. The result is driven largely by heterogeneity in the equity returns coefficients, which vary significantly across countries. Hence, we re-estimate, allowing heterogeneity on the equity coefficients only. Again, an F test on restriction of homogeneity is rejected at the 1 per cent level. The QR estimate falls to 2.1 percentage points and the Strong QR one falls to 3.3 percentage points. The intuition for why this estimate is smaller is that imposing homogeneity causes the impact of market returns to be underestimated in PPR countries. Given that the QR variable is correlated with the equity returns variable, this has the effect of biasing upward the magnitude of the QR estimate. Hence, it is important to take into consideration the results from Swamy RCM estimation. However, the trade off with Swamy RCM is that estimation of a larger number of parameters decreases degrees of freedom and reduces efficiency of estimation. Indeed, the significance of the QR estimate falls from the 5 to 10 percent level.
Testing for the impact of the Netherlands (see table A3)
The large weight of the UK as a PPR country could imply that we are measuring only a UK-specific effect relative to other countries. Therefore, to establish that these results are driven by the impact of PPR relative to QR, we re-estimate the econometric model excluding UK firms from the sample. Here the comparison is between QR countries and the Netherlands as the PPR country. The single dummy QR coefficient is no longer significant under these results, which however is explained by the far fewer observations for the Netherlands. There are insufficient observations to establish a difference between QR and PPR through a single dummy variable. The results on the index of strong and weak QR continue to hold. Strong QR countries have portfolio returns that are 3.1 percent lower, a statistically significant effect.
Testing for real returns
We also test for the effect of QR on real returns i.e. returns adjusted for differential inflation across countries. We re-calculate risk-adjusted returns accounting for both the level and volatility of inflation. The results in table A3 show that when we only account for inflation by deducting from nominal risk-adjusted returns, there is no significant change in the direction and magnitude of the QR estimate. If we also adjust the portfolio risk for volatility in inflation, the coefficient increases slightly to 3.8 per cent. This is accounted for by the higher volatility of inflation across QR countries, which further raises the differential in risk-adjusted returns between QR and PPR countries.
Testing for structural breaks
Our concerns were that the changing market conditions around 2001 with the stock market crash and subsequent bear market may also have had a significant impact on investment decisions. Hence, we conducted a Chow test for a structural break in 2001. Testing the restriction of equality of coefficient before and after 2001, we find this restriction is not rejected at the 10 per cent level, indicating no evidence of a structural break. However, a caveat needs to be added given that we do not have a lengthy time period following the break in 2001. It may be that there are insufficient time periods to detect any break which did occur.
Testing for survivorship bias
This involved excluding from the sample any firm which has missing observations for part of the time series and re-estimating. On this basis the QR estimate falls from 3.1 to 2.6 per cent (table A3) . However, this effect is largely due to Germany dropping out of the sample. For consistency, the comparison is done excluding Germany from the sample. Including firms with incomplete time series yields an estimate of 2.8 percentage points. Hence, on this basis, the estimates are robust; there does not appear to be significant evidence of survivorship bias. One needs to add a caveat that this is a rather crude method of testing for survivorship bias; data constraints prevent us from undertaking a more sophisticated analysis.
Diagnostics on residuals
The White test used to detect heteroscedasticity was not significant at 10 per cent level. However, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test was significant at the 1 per cent level. The test was repeated with respect to firm size, and was also significant at the 1 per cent level. As a further check, given our concern that the positive test for heteroscedasticity might be driven by an omitted variable, we conducted the Ramsey test for omitted variables, but this was not significant at 10 per cent level. Hence, it is safe to conclude that heteroscedasticity does not cause serious problems for the parameter estimates. However, in line with standard practice, the standard errors were corrected using White robust standard errors.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper formulates an econometric model to test the hypothesis that QR impose a cost on firms in terms of risk-adjusted returns. We find an economically and statistically significant impact of QR on portfolio returns for life insurance firms, of the magnitude of around 2-3 percentage points, adjusting for risk and controlling for other relevant factors. When we analyse in more detail the impacts of QR we find that the weak QR do not seem to impose any costs above the PPR while strong QR have an even stronger negative impact on risk-adjusted returns of about 4 percentage points.
By imposing explicit limits on investment in risky asset classes, QR constrain portfolio diversification and distort portfolio choice below the efficient frontier. Our findings indicate that a firm with the same level of risk in a strong QR country will have lower returns compared to a firm in a PPR country which does not face restrictions in terms of the assets it can allocate to its portfolio. Moreover, our results indicate that, for a given level of returns, firms under a PPR regime can achieve a lower level of risk on average. Therefore, by distorting away from the efficient frontier, QR can impose disproportionate costs on firms. Moreover, the greater flexibility afforded by PPR allows firms to diversify their portfolios and reduce market risk, thus enabling higher returns for a given level of risk.
Our analysis also sheds light on other differences between QR and PPR regimes, beyond the constraints imposed on portfolio diversification. For example, there may also be inflexibility associated with QR. Market conditions change rapidly. Firms subject to prescriptive regulation are less able to respond quickly to such changes, compared to firms under a PPR regime which receive no more instruction than to invest prudently and hold well-diversified portfolios. The lower risk-adjusted returns may therefore be explained, at least in part, by this inflexibility. However, further analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of our paper.
There are, however, some caveats which need to be considered with the results. First, the structure of a firm's liability, in particular the distinction between unitlinked, with-profits policies and fixed nominal liabilities, can be important. This will affect the composition of assets held in the investment portfolio, given that firms with a large proportion of nominal liabilities will need to ensure these are matched by investing in long-term bonds, whereas firms whose business mix contains a higher proportion of unit-linked and with-profits policies ought to have more investments in equities and property. However, we do not have data on the breakdown of liabilities to control for this effect.
Other omitted variables at the country level are also potentially significant. For example, we do not incorporate the effect of taxes on investment, in particular Capital Gains Tax and various exemptions and allowances which apply to life insurance firms across Europe. Also regulations on insurance firms other than the portfolio regulation may be important, for example capital requirements. However, to the extent that we find no evidence of fixed effects, these variables are less of a concern.
The main policy implication from these results is that strong QR can be an inefficient means of mitigating risky investment practices by insurance firms. Overall, strong QR are costly to society. They impose high costs on firms and consequently consumers without any corresponding benefits. Weak QR do not appear to be binding on firms' portfolios and may therefore not be a useful regulatory tool.
The findings provide evidence on the overall impact of QR, relative to PPR, rather than on the specific impact of restrictions on each asset class, although the results for strong QR as opposed to weak QR show that differences in the restriction on equity have a large impact on risk-adjusted returns. It may be that restrictions on other asset classes have a relatively small effect but this is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
